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Abstract 
This study identifies changes in aggregate market share between 1976 and 1988 for 
property and liability companies classified by distribution system. Evidence is presented that 
distribution system type produces differences in relative total expense levels. Market share 
changes suggest independent agency companies are most effective in l ines where claimed 
higher levels of service are important, such as in workers' compensation and the commercial 
insurance lines. The independent agency companies have been less effective in maintaining 
market share in standardized lines such as homeowners and personal automobile. In 
standardized lines, cost appears more important and claimed higher levels of service and 
professionalism are less likely to have an impact.  
Introduction 
The insurance industry is classified in numerous overlapping ways such as line of 
business, form of legal organization, territory of operation, and marketing or distribution 
system. A central dimension of an insurer's business strategy and the focus of this study is 
the selection of the distribution system. In an early study of cost effectiveness, Joskow 
[1973] suggested that independent agency companies are not as cost effective as "direct 
writer" companies. Independent agents claim they provide better service and more 
professionalism to insurance clients. In particular independent agents suggest that their ability 
to provide coverage from more than one company in a particular line of business is especially 
valuable to insureds with underwriting and loss control problems; this is common in both 
property and liability insurance commercial lines. Independent agents also claim to have an  
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advantage with insureds who have unusual or non-standard insurance needs where access 
to multiple markets is an advantage over one company representation. These qualities and 
abilities are referred to as claimed higher levels of service and professionalism.  
This paper examines market share and operating efficiency of property and liability 
insurers by distribution system for eight selected lines. Insurers are classified by dominant 
distribution system: independent agency, exclusive agency, salaried representative, and mail 
order. Market shares are reported for 1976 and 1988 by distribution system for grouped 
lines, and shifts in market share by line can be identified. These market share changes may 
be attributable to cost efficiency and to claimed higher levels of service and professionalism. 
An investigation into the cost efficiency issue reveals statistically significant differences in 
relative total expenses by line among insurers when classified by distribution system and even 
after controlling for the effects of premium output.  
Research Background 
Joskow [1973] studied structural characteristics, pricing behavior, and economies of 
scale in 1971-72 using firm size, form of business organization, and distribution system for 
firms in "automobile" and "fire and allied lines". Joskow's analysis of expense ratios indicated 
that "direct writers" (exclusive agency and salaried employee companies together in his 
analysis) had lower costs and were more efficient than independent agents. Flanigan, et. al., 
[1979] pointed out that Joskow used the "direct writer" classification which combines three 
distribution systems which have substantially different characteristics and demonstrated how 
Joskow's findings were unreliable. Cummins and VanDerhei [1979] also faulted Joskow for 
only considering underwriting expenses and not loss adjustment expenses. After allowing for 
loss adjustment expenses, they conclude that the differences are less pronounced than 
Joskow reported but found that the independent agency distribution system remained more 
costly. 
Johnson, et. al., [1981] analyzed operating expenses of 262 property and liability 
insurers during 1976. They found decreasing returns to scale for small to medium size 
insurers and increasing returns to scale for large insurers. Independent agency companies had 
the highest relative cost and salaried companies had the lowest relative cost; however, they 
concluded the major contributing factor to cost differences was insurance product output and 
not distribution system. 
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For life insurance companies, Harrington [19821 used a multiple regression analysis 
to compare standard expense ratios averaged during 1974-75 for 76 life insurers. 
Independent variables were used to control for size, home office wage rates, degree of 
specialization in ordinary life insurance and annuities, relative amount of permanent to 
total l i fe insurance in force, and for ownership. Harrington tests both a semi -log and 
log-linear specification using OLS and maximum likel ihood (ML).  His f indings suggest 
relative expenses decrease at a decreasing rate,  with scale economies particularly 
pronounced for other than independent agency insurers.  
Zweifel and Ghermi [1990] examined the performance of exclusive and 
independent agency companies  dur ing 1980-85  in  the  Sw iss market .  Their  s tudy 
compared premium growth, underwriting expense ratios, and the settled claim ratios for 
insurers. Underwriting expense ratios were found to decrease with increases in premiums 
written, suggesting some economies of scale. They also found independent agency 
companies had lower underwriting expense rat ios and loss rat ios not  stat ist ical ly 
di f ferent  from those of  exclusive agency companies. 
Data 
The sample consists of 2,549 company observations in eight lines of busine ss as 
listed in Best's Aggregates and Averages 1988.  The eights lines are commercial auto liability 
(CAL), commercial auto property damage (CAPD), commercial multi peril (CMP), 
homeowners (HMP), other commercial liability (OL), private passenger auto liability (FPAL), 
private passenger auto physical damage (PPAPD), and workers' compensation (WC). 
From the initial sample, 246 obser va t ions  had miss ing expense  data .  The  f ina l  
sample  cons is ts  o f  2 , 303  company observations with the following number of insurers 
in each line (shown in parentheses): CAL (252) ,  CAPD (163),  CMP (286) ,  HMP i285),  OL 
(263) ,  PPAL (407),  PPAPD (350),  and WC (297) .  Al l  companies were included except  
those w ith miss ing or  incomple te data .  
The final sample of 2,303 company observations in the eight lines was classified 
by distribution channel as follows: 1,901 independent agency companies; 231 salaried 
employee companies; 141 exclusive agency companies; and 30 mad order companies. The 
distribution system was identified from Best's Insurance Reports  when not possible 
from the authors'  know ledge.  A te lephone inquiry w as  made for  53  insurers  that  
could  not  be  otherw ise  identi f ied.  Some companies employ more than one 
distr ibution system.  In those instances,  61 
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 the company was coded according to the predominant distribution system.1  
Table 1 contrasts market share by distribution system for the four combined 
classes between 1976 and 1988. In order to present a consistent distribution system 
comparison of market share between 1976 and 1988, the eight lines were combined into 
four: homeowners, automobile (commercial and private passenger), workers 
compensation, and commercial.
2 
The market shares reported in the table suggest that the independent agents' 
claimed greater professionalism, service, and access to markets has proven important in 
lines where these companies have held market share.. While market share increased 
slightly in the workers' compensation line, independent agents lost a large market share in 
homeowners and automobile lines. Corresponding market share gains were made primarily 
by salaried employee companies in these lines. 
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Methodology 
This study seeks to determine by l ine of insurance the relative price 
differentials between companies using independent, exclusive, and salaried employee 
distribution systems. It is reasonable to expect independent agency companies will 
concentrate on product lines in which customers require more service, professionalism, 
and multiple company market access. Independent agency insurers have more latitude to 
tailor the particular needs of the customer to a diverse product l ine.  Thus one would 
expect independent agency insurers to develop cost efficiency on l ines requir ing 
greater special ization, service, and professionalism.  
Independent agency company efficiency efforts should be measurable through 
changes in efficiency and market share in specific  lines. I f the independent agency 
system is more expensive but delivers higher levels of service and professionalism, one 
would expect insurers using this system to have greater abili ty to retain market share in 
lines where service and professionalism are important.  Similarly one would expect that 
in l ines where service and professionalism are not as important as pricing, low cost 
operation would become a more important factor, and salaried employee and exclusive 
agency companies would have greater  63 
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 possibilities to increase market share. This study seeks to identify changes in market 
share since 1976 and to identify cost efficiency implications by line.  
Previous research on relative efficiency in the property-liability insurance 
industry confirms the importance of scale of output in explaining costs. Cummins 
and VanDerhei [1979] test efficiency using a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
measure product output by direct premiums written. Zweifel and Ghermi [1990] 
compare underwriting expense ratios of exclusive and independent agency insurers 
and measure output using gross premiums written. Johnson, et. al. [1981], used 
earned premiums to measure output. The writers of this paper tested several 
measures of output and found the total expense model employed in this study is robust 
to all of the aforementioned output measures but found net premiums written offered 
the best specification of output. Consistent with previous studies on cost efficiency, a 
log specification for net written premiums is appropriate. It should be noted that Cummins 
and Vanderhei [1979] found that expenses of exclusive agency companies are lower in 
absolute and relative terms when loss adjustment costs are considered.  
Cost efficiency is measured by a trade basis expense ratio defined as: 
(underwriting expenses/written premiums) plus (loss adjustment expenses 
incurred/premiums earned). This measure matches underwriting expenses appropriately 
to when premiums are booked and, likewise, loss adjustment expenses more closely to 
when they are incurred; this procedure is consistent with Best's reporting practices. 
Expenses are allocated between lines by Best's in the same way the companies file 
them on a by line basis in the NAIC Annual Conventions statement. 
The model  specif ication for examining relat ive cost  ef f iciency for 
al ternat ive distribution channels for each line is:  
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 The model specification in Equation 1 compares two distribution channels for 
f ive combinations. The use of regression permits a test of  the mean total  cost ratio 
for each distr ibution system while controll ing for economies of scale  as measured by 
the output measure. Although equation (1) has fewer degrees of freedom than a model 
with multiple channel dummy variables, both collinearity problems among the independent 
variables and the intercept are minimized by its use. Thus the coefficients in equation (11 
are easy to interpret.
3  
Results 
Table 2 presents the difference in relative total  e xpenses for independent 
agency companies versus salaried employee companies in each of the eight lines. The 
coefficient " independent" indicates the higher  or ( lower)  percentage costs of 
independent agency companies in relation to salaried employee companie s;  for 
example,  independent agency companies have 5.371 percent higher costs than salaried 
employee companies in CAL.
4
 The premium output variable, Ln(NWP), defined as the 
natural logarithm of net written premiums, provides clear evidence of such economies . 
The negative signs of six of eight regression models are statistically significant, 
consistent with the expectation that relative costs decline  
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with size. The analysis uses the semi-log regression form used by Harrington (1982).
5
 The 
differences in the mean total expense occurs in homeowners (10.442 percent higher), 
commercial multi peril (6.403 percent higher), workers' compensation (5.716 percent higher), 
commercial auto property damage (5.443 percent higher), commercial auto liability (5.371 
percent higher), and private passenger auto physical damage (3.357 percent higher). The 
private passenger auto liability and other commercial lines show mean relative expenses 
insignificantly different from zero. 
Table 3 presents the analysis of relative total expenses for salaried employee versus 
exclusive agent companies. Only one of eight lines has statistically different costs.  
A coefficient of —5.918 percent for private passenger auto liability suggests that 
exclusive agency companies, after allowance for premium output, have significantly lower 
costs in this line. Although all other lines except private passenger auto property damage are 
positive, the coefficients are not significant, perhaps because of the small samples.  
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By combining salaried and exclusive samples as direct writers, an aggregated 
analysis of distr ibution systems is possible.  Table 4 suggests that  the differences 
between salaried  
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 and exclusive distribution systems are less pronounced than the differences between 
salaried and independents. When exclusive and salaried samples are combined as direct 
writers, the coefficients are somewhat lower than the salaried employee differential shown 
in Table 2 for commer c ia l  auto  l i ab i l i t y ,  commer c ia l  auto  pr oper ty  damage ,  
commerc ia l  mu l t i  per i l ,  homeowners, and workers'  compensation.  
Table 5 shows the four l ines represented by mai l  order companies. Only the 
private passenger auto l iabil i ty and the private passenger auto property damage 
regressions are statistically significant.  The mean difference in the total  expense ratio 
was -7.625 percent percent in the PPAL line. Once again, larger firms had lower relative 
costs than smaller ones.  
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 Table 6 shows a comparison of total relative expenses for the independent 
and exclusive agency companies. The independent variable measuring output is net 
premiums 
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 writ ten,  NPW. The t -values are show n in parentheses.  Only four  l ines show 
stat ist ical ly higher costs for the independent channel versus the exclusive agency 
channel. The mean differential is 4.942 percent for commercial auto liability, 6.053 
percent for private passenger auto l iabil i ty,  5.889 percent for private passenger auto 
property damage, and 6.330 percent for homeowners lines.  
Conclusions  
The claimed superior service versus greater cost  e f f ic iency issue  has 
generated considerable attention in the literature. In the lines where claimed service and 
professionalism should logically be more important,  the independent agency companies 
are holding market share even as they are less cost  eff ic ient .  These l ines are 
workers'  compensation and commercial insurance. The independent agency system 
lost substantial  market share where one w ould  expect  service and professional ism 
strengths to  be  less important ,  notably homeowners and automobile l ines.  
The findings suggest independent agency companies are more effective in some 
lines. When compared with salaried employee companies, independent agency 
companies have higher relative total expenses in six of eight lines only. Independent 
agency coefficients for private passenger auto liability and other commercial liability are 
not statistically significant. Independent agency companies  appear more costly in the 
more simple and standardized personal l ines such as homeowners.  
The f indings also show exclusive agency companies are more cost efficient 
than independent agency companies in commercial  auto l iabil i ty,  homeowners, and 
personal automobile lines. Holding constant the effects of premium output, the total 
expense ratio for exclusive agency companies is statistically lower than for independent 
agency companies for four of eight l ines .  
This research differs from much of the other work on insurer efficiency by 
looking at the total expense ratios on a line-by-line basis. As with all studies, there are 
limitations. The measurement  of  se r v ice  and pr o fess iona l i sm is  be yond the  scope 
o f  th is  s tudy.  T he  regression model in this study controls f or premium output,  
however, other potential factors such as form of business organization and terr itory 
have not been investigated.  
One implication of this study is that the developments in the industry are 
consistent with allocational efficiency. Because cost efficiency appears greatest on 
average for salaried  
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 employee and exclusive agency companies and cost per unit  declines with output, it 
is reasonable to suppose cost efficiency will guide the industry for standardized 
products (homeowners, personal auto) to large firms with a salaried employee and to a 
lesser extent exclusive agency distribution channels.  
Endnotes 
1. For example, Allstate Insurance Company, which is classif ied as a salaried  
agent  company, has appointed independent and exclusive agents to represent it where 
there are no Sears stores. Since the majority of its business is produced through salaried 
agents, it is classified as a salaried employee company with a salaried employee 
distribution system. A list of companies by distribution system is available from the 
authors on request.  
2. Combining eight  l ines to four was necessary to be consistent  with market  
share  reporting by Flanigan, et al. (1979). Instead of using insurer groups a s reported by 
Flanigan, et. al. (1979), the 1988 market shares shown in Table 1 combine specific lines 
for individual insurers, therefore, the two studies' data sources are not strictly 
comparable. However, large differences in market share between 1976 and 1988 are 
unlikely to be caused by these sample differences.  
3. Separate samples for independent, exclusive, and mail order distribution systems 
were initially combined for each line. However, excessive collinearity between indicator 
variables for independent and exclusive distribution systems produced excessive 
standard errors in the regressions. Separate regressions controlled for the collinearity 
problem. 
4. Heteroscedasticity was identified using a test developed by White (19801. 
Reported  findings are corrected regressions using the procedure recommended by 
White. 
5.    Regression specif ications were tested using net premiums written and the 
natural  logarithm of net premiums written. The latter transformation substantially 
improved the regression model's explained variability and statistical significance.  
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